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Abstract—As the Routing Protocol for Low Power and Lossy
Networks (RPL) became the standard for routing in the Internet
of Things (IoT) networks, many researchers had investigated the
security aspects of this protocol. However, no work (to the best
of our knowledge) has investigated the use of the security mech-
anisms included in RPL’s standard, mainly because there was no
implementation for these features in any IoT operating systems
yet. A partial implementation of RPL’s security mechanisms was
presented recently for the Contiki operating system (by Perazzo
et al.), which provided us with an opportunity to examine RPL’s
security mechanisms. In this paper, we investigate the effects and
challenges of using RPL’s security mechanisms under common
routing attacks. First, a comparison of RPL’s performance,
with and without its security mechanisms, under four routing
attacks (Blackhole, Selective-Forward, Neighbor, and Wormhole
attacks) is conducted using several metrics (e.g., average data
packet delivery rate, average data packet latency, average power
consumption, etc.). This comparison is performed using two
commonly used Radio Duty-Cycle protocols. Secondly, and based
on the observations from this comparison, we propose two
techniques that could reduce the effects of such attacks, without
having added security mechanisms for RPL. An evaluation of
these techniques shows improved performance of RPL under the
investigated attacks, except for the Wormhole attack.
Index Terms—Security and Privacy, Resource-Constrained
Networks, Secure Communication, Secure RPL, Routing Attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Routing is one of the most researched fields in the world of
IoT, due to the constraint nature of these devices. Introduced
by Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), RPL [1] had
become the standard for routing in many IoT networks as it
was designed to efficiently use the constrained resources of IoT
devices, while providing effective routing services. Routing
security was an integral part of RPL’s design with several, but
optional, security mechanisms available [1].
Since it became a standard in 2012, RPL gained a great
deal of research interest, with many of the literature focus-
ing on the security aspects of routing using the protocol,
such as types of routing attacks, new mitigation methods
and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), and security-minded
Objective Functions (OFs) [2]–[6]. Interestingly, there has
been no research discussing the effects of using RPL’s security
mechanisms, specifically under routing attacks. This is most
probably due to the lack of implementation of RPL’s security
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mechanisms in any of the available IoT Operating Systems
(OSs), such as Contiki OS [7] and TinyOS [8].
However, recently Perazzo et al. in [9] provided a partial
implementation of RPL’s security mechanisms for Contiki OS,
which added Preinstalled Secure Mode (PSM) and the optional
replay protection mechanism. This implementation provided
us with the basis upon which the work in this paper is built
on. In this paper, we have experimentally investigated RPL’s
performance under four common routing attacks using several
metrics to analyze and compare the performance between
having RPL’s security mechanisms enabled or disabled.
The work in this paper provides a significant extension
to our previous conference paper [10]. Specifically, we first
introduced a new scenario for an RPL Wormhole attack to
the evaluation. Then, we extended the evaluation of RPL’s
performance from using one Radio Duty-Cycle (RDC) proto-
col (the ContikiMAC protocol) to include the effect of using
another commonly used RDC protocol, namely the NullRDC
protocol - see §IV-D. Finally, for the two techniques we
proposed in [10] to improve RPL’s performance under the
investigated attack, we conducted an extensive evaluation of
these two techniques and their effects on RPL’s performance
under the investigated attacks and using the two underlying
RDC protocols.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• Through more than a thousand experiments, we provided
a performance comparison for RPL between the Unse-
cured Mode (UM) and PSM; the latter is examined with
and without the optional replay protection. We showed
that running RPL in PSM (without replay protection) does
not use more resources than UM, even under an attack.
• We verified that RPL in PSM can stop external adver-
saries from joining the IoT network for the investigated
attacks, except for the Wormhole attack. Furthermore, we
showed that the optional replay protection also provides
excellent mitigation against the Neighbor attack. How-
ever, it needs further optimization to reduce its effect on
energy consumption.
• We observed and analyzed the effect of the investigated
attacks on the routing topology and proposed two simple
techniques that could help reduce the effects of the inves-
tigated attacks, without using external security measures
such as IDSs or added security mechanisms.
• Another performance comparison of the implementation
of the proposed techniques was conducted. The results
showed improved performance of RPL under the Black-
hole and Selective-Forward attacks, in terms of packet
delivery rate (PDR) and end-to-end (E2E) latency.
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The rest of this paper goes as follows: Section II looks
into the related works. In section III an overview of RPL and
its security mechanisms is presented. Section IV discusses our
evaluation methodology, setup, assumptions, adversary model,
and attack scenarios. Evaluation results are analyzed in section
V. Section VI discuses our observations from the results
and proposes two suggestions to be used when designing
RPL-based IoT networks. In addition, an implementation of
the proposed suggestions is evaluated and the results are
discussed. Finally, our work is concluded in VII.
II. RELATED WORKS
This section highlights some influencing literature that dis-
cussed RPL’s performance under common routing attacks. As
stated earlier, none of them had investigated RPL’s security
mechanisms, except for the conference version of this paper.
Le et al. in [11] evaluated RPL’s performance under four
RPL-based attacks: the Decreased Rank, Local Repair, Neigh-
bor, and DODAG1 Information Solicitation (DIS) attacks.
Their work showed that the Decreased Rank and the Local
Repair attacks affect the PDR the most, while the DIS attack
introduced the most E2E latency. The Neighbor attack showed
the least impact on the network. Compared to our work, the
authors only tackled with the unsecured mode of RPL while
ignoring the effect of their attacks on power consumption.
Kumar et al. in [12] investigated the effects of the Black-
hole attack, on RPL-based network through simulations. As
expected, the attack was successful in reducing the PDR and
increased both the E2E latency and control messages overhead.
However, the authors did not evaluate the power consumption
and neglected the existence of RPL’s security mechanisms.
Perazzo et al. in [9], [13] provided the first, standard-
compliant as per their claim, partial implementation of RPL
security mechanisms. One secure mode, the Preinstalled se-
cure mode, and the optional replay protection, named the
Consistency Check (CC) mechanism, were introduced to Con-
tikiRPL (Contiki OS version of RPL). The authors provided
an evaluation for their implementation and compared RPL’s
performance between using and not using the PSM. However,
It is worth noting that the authors did not evaluate their
implementation against actual attacks.
Our previous work in [14] presented the first glimpse of the
effects that RPL’s security mechanisms could have on RPL-
based IoT networks when there is an actual attack. RPL’s
performance (with and without PSM) was investigated under
three attacks: the Blackhole, Selective-Forward, and Neighbor
attacks using simulations. The preliminary results showed that
RPL’s secure modes can mitigate the external adversaries of
the investigated attacks, not the internal ones. However, it did
not provide an in-depth analysis of the results nor inspected
the optional replay protection mechanism.
III. BACKGROUND REVIEW
A. RPL Overview
RPL was developed as a distance-vector routing protocol
[1]. It arranges the network devices into a Destination Oriented
1DODAG = Destination-Oriented Directed Acyclic Graph
Directed Acyclic Graphs (DODAGs) [15]: a network of nodes
connected without loops and where the traffic is directed
toward one root or sink node [1], [16].
The creation of the DODAG depends on the used OF,
which defines essential configurations such as the used routing
metrics, how to calculate the rank2, and how to select parents
in the DODAG. To accommodate the different applications and
environments where RPL can be deployed, RPL has several
OFs [2], [17], [18] available for use [19]. Also, deployments
of RPL can have their own OFs.
RPL supports three types of traffic: Multi-Point to Point
communication (MP2P) traffic (nodes to sink) through normal
DODAG, Point to Multi-Point communication (P2MP) traffic
(sink to nodes) through source routing, and Point to Point
communication (P2P) traffic (non-root node to non-root node)
through RPL’s Modes of Operation (MOP) [1], which dictate
how the downward routes are created.
RPL has five types of control messages; four of them have
two versions (base and secure versions), and the last one has
only a secure version. The secure version of RPL’s control
messages adds new unencrypted header fields and either a
Message Authentication Code (MAC) or a digital signature
field to the end of the base version, then encrypts the base
part and the MAC [1].
DODAG Information Object (DIO) and DODAG Informa-
tion Solicitation (DIS) messages are used for the creation and
maintenance of the DODAG [1]. The root node starts the
DODAG creation by multicasting a DIO message that contains
the essential DODAG configurations and the root node’s rank
(the root node has the lowest rank in the DODAG). Upon
receiving a DIO message, each node will select its preferred
parent, calculate its own rank, and multicast a new DIO with
its calculated rank [1], [19]. DIS messages are used to solicit
DIO messages from node’s neighbors when needed, e.g., a
new node wants to join the networks or no DIO messages had
arrived for a long time [1].
Destination Advertisement Object (DAO) and DAO Ac-
knowledgements (DAO-ACKs) messages are the backbones
of the downward routes creation [1]. The DAO contains
path information about reachable nodes by its sender, and
depending on RPL’s mode of operation, it will be used to
create the downward routing table. Based on the DODAG’s
configurations, a flag in the DAO message will mandate an
acknowledgment (DAO-ACK message) from the receiver.
B. RPL’s Security Mechanisms
To secure the routing service, RPL either relies on the
security measures at the Link layer (i.e., IEEE 802.15.4 [20])
or uses its own security mechanisms, resembled in three modes
of security and an optional replay protection mechanism [1],
[9]: The default mode for RPL is the Unsecured mode (UM),
where only the link-layer security is applied, if available. The
second mode, the Preinstalled secure mode (PSM), which
uses the preinstalled symmetrical encryption keys to secure
RPL control messages. Finally, the Authenticated secure mode
2The rank of a node represents its distance to the root node based on the
routing metrics defined by the OF
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Fig. 1. Network topology for the Blackhole, Selective-Forward, and Neighbor
attacks scenarios (better viewed in colors.)
(ASM) uses the preinstalled keys for the nodes to join the
network, after which all routing-capable nodes have to acquire
new keys from an authentication authority. To protect the
routing service from replay attacks, RPL uses Consistency
Checks as an optional mechanism that can be used with either
the preinstalled (PSMrp) or authenticated mode (ASMrp). In
these checks, a special secure control message (CC message)
with non-repetitive nonce value is exchanged and used to
assure no replay had occurred [1].
IV. EVALUATION OF RPL’S SECURITY MECHANISMS
UNDER ATTACKS
In this paper, RPL performance is evaluated against four
attacks [19], [21]: the Blackhole, the Selective-Forward, the
Neighbor, and the Wormhole attacks. Experiments were con-
ducted with RPL in both UM (vanilla ContikiRPL) and PSM
(as in Perazzo et al. [9] implementation). For the latter, we
evaluated RPL with and without the optional replay protection
mechanism.
A. Evaluation Setup
Cooja, the simulator for Contiki OS [7], was used for all the
simulations (with simulated motes). Fig.1 shows the topology
used in our evaluation for the Blackhole, Selective-Forward,
and Neighbor attacks, while Fig.2 shows the one used to
evaluate the Wormhole attack (as two adversaries are needed).
A list of simulation parameters is provided in Table I.
Both topologies represent a single DODAG network with
one root or sink node (the green node). The minimum number
of adversaries required for each attack was used to reduce
the complexity of the observed metrics. For the Blackhole,
Selective-Forward, and Neighbor attacks, node (27) was used
as an adversary and positioned near the sink node, which
would introduce the most prominent effect of the three attacks
[21]–[23]. For the Wormhole attack, two adversaries (nodes
27 and 29) were used and positioned to create a wormhole
Fig. 2. Network topology for the Wormhole attack scenario.
TABLE I
LIST OF SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Description Value
No. of sim. sets Two: one for each RDC pro-tocol (See §IV-D)
No. of experiments per set Four (See §IV-C)
No. of scenarios per experiment 4 (ContikiMAC) / 5 (NullRDC)
No. of sim. rounds per scenario / time 10 rounds / 20 min. per round
Node Positioning Random (three clusters)
Deployment area 290m W x 310m L
Number of nodes (adversary included) 28 (ContikiMAC) / 29 (Null-RDC)
Sensor nodes type Arago Sys. Wismote mote
DATA transmission rate ' 1 packet per minute perlegitimate node
between the node cluster (1, 7, 20, and 26) and the targeted
nodes. The targeted nodes for all the attacks are (2, 5, 6, 8, 12,
15, 18, 21, and 28), with node (28) providing an alternative
path for the targeted nodes to send their packets toward the
sink. Having an alternative path is crucial to our experiments to
examine how the self-healing mechanisms of RPL will respond
to the attacks.
Note that we tried to implement the simulations using
Zolertia Z1 motes [24] (each has 8KB RAM and 92KB Flash
memory) to compare our results to that of [14]. However,
enabling the replay protection mechanism of RPL in our
simulation caused the mote to always run out of RAM,
rendering the simulation impractical. Hence, we moved to the
more powerful Wismote motes (each has 16KB RAM and a
256KB Flash memory [25]).
B. Assumptions
The following assumptions were used in our evaluation:
RPL uses the default OF, namely the Minimum Rank with
Hysteresis Objective Function (MRHOF) [18]. To keep the
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focus on RPL at the Network layer, we assumed neither
security measures nor encryption was enabled at the Link
layer. All the attacks were implemented at the Network layer.
Our data traffic model is a deterministic one that mimics
a typical sensing-IoT network, where nodes send their sensor
readings toward the root node at predetermined periods. In our
model, only the legitimate nodes send data packets toward the
root, each sending one packet per minute, while the adversaries
only participate in the DODAG formation without sending any
data packets.
The results obtained from the simulations were averaged
over ten rounds for each scenario with a 95% confidence level.
C. Adversary Model and Attack Scenarios
For each RDC protocol (see §IV-D), we conducted a set of
four experiments: the first three experiments (RPL in UM, RPL
in PSM, and RPL in PSMrp) have an internal adversary, who
participates in the creation of the topology from the beginning
(and has the preinstalled encryption keys in the 2nd and 3rd
experiments). The fourth experiment (RPL in PSM) uses an
external adversary who runs RPL in UM and does not have the
knowledge of the secure versions of RPL’s control messages,
while the legitimate nodes run RPL in PSM. Table II lists the
settings for these experiments.
For the attacks themselves, we have five scenarios:
1) No Attack: the adversary works as a fully legitimate node.
2) Blackhole Attack (BH): the adversary drops all types of
traffic coming through, including RPL control messages
and data packets [19]. In our evaluation, the adversary
will keep its radio operational according to the RDC
protocol, but it will simply discard any incoming or
outgoing frames.
3) Selective-Forward Attack (SF): the adversary drops any
non-RPL packets, including data. However, only RPL
control messages will be processed as normal and passed
[22]. Similarly to BH, our simulation of the adversary
will keep its radio operational, but it will check the
"Type" field of any incoming or outgoing Internet Control
Message Protocol (ICMPv6) packet to see if it holds an
RPL control message (RPL’s Type is 155). If the packet
is an RPL control message, it will be processed as usual
and passed. All other types of packets will be discarded.
4) Neighbor Attack (NA): the adversary will pass any DIO
message it receives from its neighbors without any pro-
cessing or modification [11]. This will create the illusion
of having the original sender in the range of the victim
nodes. Our simulation of this adversary is a simple
one: while operating as a legitimate node, whenever the
adversary receives a DIO message (even if it was not
addressed to it), it will multicast an exact copy of the
received message to its sub-DODAG before processing
the message as usual.
5) Out-of-Band Wormhole Attack (WH): two adversaries use
an out-of-band link to forward RPL control messages
from legitimate nodes between the two locations where
the adversaries reside [19], [26]. This scenario is available
only in the NullRDC set of experiments, see §IV-D.
TABLE II
EXPERIMENTS SUMMARY
Experiment Secure Mode Replay Protection Adversary Type
UM-I × × Internal (I)
PSM-I X × Internal (I)
PSMrp-I X X Internal (I)
PSM-E X × External (E)
In the BH, SF, and NA scenarios, the adversary always starts
as a legitimate node, tries to join the network, and actively
participates in the creation and maintenance of the DODAG.
Then, it works as a legitimate node for two minutes (to assure
full integration with the network) before launching the attack
afterward. For the Wormhole attack, the two adversaries are
always in promiscuous mode and never participate in the
DODAG.
The choice of these attacks was based on the fact that they
have a minimum cost for the adversary to launch them, as they
require little or no processing of RPLâA˘Z´s messages. At the
same time, the effect of these attacks can be significant on the
network.
It is worth mentioning that our simulation of the Wormhole
attack is based upon the work in [27]. The authors imple-
mented an out-of-band wormhole on a real testbed, with a
wired link between the adversaries. Each adversary operates
in the promiscuous mode, sniffs all types of frames, sends the
sniffed frames through the wired link, and replays the frames
it received from the wired link. However, our implementation
differs from theirs in a few points:
1) Our implementation is simulation-based and is conducted
in Cooja. We use the host computer to emulate a fast link
between the adversaries.
2) The wormhole is implemented at the Network layer level
in order to detect and replay RPL’s control messages
only. In addition, the adversaries can identify the secure
versions of RPL’s control messages.
3) The adversaries use a multi-buffer approach for the pack-
ets received from the radio and for the packets awaiting
the replay. This approach accelerates the operation of the
adversaries when there are many neighbors, and makes
sure that all forwarded packets are replayed without
dropping any of them.
D. Implementation Challenges
Contiki OS [7] divides the Link layer into three sub-
layers: the Medium Access Control (MAC) sub-layer, which is
responsible for addressing, sequencing, and retransmissions;
the FRAMER sub-layer that is responsible for creating and
parsing of frames; and the RDC sub-layer that controls the
radio component. Currently, Contiki OS comes with several
RDC protocols, with the most used ones are the ContikiMAC
[28] and NullRDC.
ContikiMAC is the default setting for RDC protocol in
Contiki OS. Here, the radio is kept off most of the time, with
the protocol waking up the radio periodically to check for
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transmissions. If a transmission is detected, the radio will be
kept on long enough to receive the frame, send an ACK to the
sender (if it was accepted) [28], [29], then the radio is turned
off. Similarly, the sender will turn on the radio, probe the
channel, perform several attempts to transmit a frame, and wait
for either an ACK (which dictates a successful transmission) or
reach a threshold that means a failed transmission [28]. Either
way, the radio is turned off afterward. ContikiMAC protocol
is proved to be very efficient with power consumption, at the
expense of having longer E2E latency [29].
On the other hand, the NullRDC protocol keeps the radio
always on and does not perform frequent channel probing,
which means lower E2E latency and a smaller number of
retransmissions at the expense of higher power consumption
[29].
During our implementation of the Wormhole attack using
the ContikiMAC protocol, we found that the messages for-
warded through the wormhole were replayed very late by
the adversaries; hence, those messages got ignored by the
legitimate nodes. A further investigation showed that a mix
of simulation environment latency and the lengthy sending
procedure of ContikiMAC are the culprits for such late replay.
Several trials were made to reduce simulation latency (e.g.,
reducing output text, using faster host, etc.) and accelerate
ContikiMAC sending procedure; all have failed.
However, implementing the Wormhole attack using the
NullRDC protocol proved to be working perfectly. Since the
sending procedure is much simpler than that of ContikiMAC,
the Wormhole attack performed as expected, without any
added latency and resulting in full disruption to the routing
topology (as explained later). Since the power consumption,
in this case, is dominated by the high usage of the always-
on radio (almost fixed at 122 milliwatts), we are not able
to evaluate the effect of the investigated attacks on power
consumption using the NullRDC protocol.
For that reason, only the NullRDC experiment set evaluates
the Wormhole attack, omitting the power consumption metric.
V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The results for ContikiMAC and NullRDC sets of experi-
ments are shown in Fig.3 and Fig.6, respectively. Tables III
and IV show the numerical values of all results obtained in
this paper. These results are expressed as the average PDR,
average E2E latency, the number of exchanged RPL control
messages (per legitimate node), and average network power
consumption (per received packet). Fig.9 and Fig. 10 show the
routing DODAG for each scenario that was formed in 90% of
the time in all experiments.
A. ContikiMAC Set Results
Effects on packet delivery rate (PDR): Looking at Fig.3a,
it is clear that the RPL in PSM successfully mitigated the
BH, SF, and NA when the adversary is external with the PDR
hovering around 98%.
On the other hand, when the adversary is internal, the
SF attack has the most effect (in all experiments) on the
PDR, decreasing it to a low of 70%. The main reason behind
the success is that the adversary, due to being an active
participant in the DODAG maintenance, is always chosen as
the preferred parent for its sub-DODAG. However, none of
their data packets are passed to the sink node. Fig.9a shows
the routing DODAG during the SF attack.
For the BH attack, the self-healing mechanisms of RPL
were always able to detect the unresponsive adversary after
approximately ten minutes from the attack launch time (which
is the default setting for "dead parent" timeouts in the Contiki
OS) and initiated a local repair for the affected sub-DODAG
to switch to an alternative path. Hence, not all data packets
got dropped, which explains why PDR is in the range of 80%.
Fig.9b shows the routing DODAG after ten minutes from the
BH attack launch time and the isolated adversary.
Finally, for the Neighbor attack, the adversary was able to
reduce the PDR for the UM-I and PSM-I experiments, as node
18 always chose either node 7 or 13 as its preferred parent
(Fig.9c shows that node 18 selected node 7 as its preferred
parent), due to receiving their DIO messages through the
adversary. Since nodes 7 and 13 are actually out of node 18’s
range, all packets sent toward them from node 18 and its sub-
DODAG are lost. Hence, the PDR is in the same range as in the
BH attack scenario. However, activating the replay protection
mechanism results in much better PDR as the mechanism
verifies each DIO message’s original sender before processing
its contents. Fig.9d demonstrate how the network (in PSMrp-I
experiment) opted for the alternative path after a few minutes
from launching the NA.
Effects on the E2E latency: Confirming our findings
mentioned above, Fig.3b shows that the RPL in PSM mitigated
the BH, SF, and NA when they were launched by an external
adversary, keeping the E2E latency at a minimum.
Due to the large number of undelivered data packets for
the affected nodes, the SF attack had the longest E2E latency
among all the internal attacks. This effect is, again, due to the
adversary’s active participation in the DODAG maintenance.
For the same reason, the BH attack introduced some latency
to the network. However, since the affected nodes were able
to find an alternative path and were successful in delivering
the rest of their data packets, the latency was much lower than
in the SF attack scenario.
The situation is more complicated for the NA scenario,
as self-healing mechanisms were triggered several times to
recover the affected nodes from the attack, which led to even
higher E2E latency than the BH attack scenario. In general,
whenever node 18 switches its preferred parent to node 7 or
13, the sub-DODAG suffers from Blackhole-like conditions
resulting in losing several data packets. In addition, node 18
will either switch its preferred parent back to the adversary
when it does not receive DIO messages from the "ghost parent"
(node 7 or node 13), or initiate a local repair procedure (if
DODAG inconsistencies were detected) that results in the
whole sub-DODAG choosing the alternative path to deliver
their packets. Either way, it will add more latency to the
network. Using the replay protection will significantly reduce
the latency from the NA, as node 18 will not switch its
preferred parent as long as it does not receive the correct CC
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Fig. 3. Simulation results for the four experiments (three attacks scenarios), using ContikiMAC RDC protocol. (UM: unsecured mode, PSM: preinstalled
secure mode, PSMrp: preinstalled secure mode with replay protection, I: internal adversary, E: external adversary.)
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Fig. 4. Simulation results for the first suggestion (having more routes toward the root node), using ContikiMAC RDC protocol.
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Fig. 5. Simulation results for the second suggestion (reducing the timeout value for declaring a parent as dead), using ContikiMAC RDC protocol.
response from nodes 7 and 13.
Effects on the exchanged number of RPL’s control mes-
sages: As seen in Fig.3d, the number of control messages ex-
changed in the network is almost the same for all experiments
and all the scenarios, with the replay protection mechanisms
adding a bit more control messages. The exception of this
conclusion is the NA scenario with RPL in PSMrp. In this
particular case, the replay protection mechanism introduced a
much higher number of control messages, due to the exchange
of the CC messages whenever a "ghost" DIO message is
received by nodes 7, 13, or 18.
It is worth noting that the number of received control
messages is always higher than the sent one because many
of the sent control messages are multicast messages which
will be received by all neighboring nodes of the sender.
Effects on power consumption: Fig.3c shows the average
network power consumption per received packet, as it gives
a more accurate look into the effect of the attacks on the
power consumption than just using the regular average power
consumption readings.
Looking at the results of the external adversary experiment
in the No Attack scenario, we can see that the power con-
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Fig. 6. Simulation results for the four experiments (four attacks scenarios), using NullRDC RDC protocol.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
No Attack Blackhole
Attack
SF Attack Neighbor
Attack
Wormhole
Attack
UM-I PSM-I PSMrp-I PSM-E
(a) Average packet delivery rate (PDR).
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
No Attack Blackhole
Attack
SF Attack Neighbor
Attack
Wormhole
Attack
Se
co
n
d
s
UM-I PSM-I PSMrp-I PSM-E
(b) Average network E2E latency.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
No Attack Blackhole
Attack
SF Attack Neighbor
Attack
Wormhole
Attack
No Attack Blackhole
Attack
SF Attack Neighbor
Attack
Wormhole
Attack
Sent Received
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
C
o
n
tr
o
l M
es
sa
ge
s
UM-I PSM-I PSMrp-I PSM-E
(c) Exchanged RPL control messages, per legitimate node.
Fig. 7. Simulation results for all four attacks with the first suggestion implemented, using NullRDC RDC protocol.
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(c) Exchanged RPL control messages, per legitimate node.
Fig. 8. Simulation results for all four attacks with the second suggestion implemented, using NullRDC RDC protocol.
sumption is a bit higher than the same scenario in the other
experiments. The reason is that the data packets from the
affected nodes are taking the alternative and longer path, i.e.,
more power is used by the nodes on that path. However, the
power consumption pattern is identical in all the scenarios of
the external adversary experiment, which indicates no effect
from the attacks; hence, successful mitigation of the attacks.
For all internal-adversary experiments, the power consump-
tion patterns (per scenario) are very similar between RPL
in UM and PSM for the No Attack, BH, and SF attacks
scenarios, with the replay protection mechanism having a bit
more power consumption than the rest. This is because many
data packets were not delivered, and the power consumed for
their unsuccessful deliveries is entirely wasted.
Now, it is clear from Fig.3c that using the replay protection
significantly increases the average power consumption when
the NA is launched, even if almost all of the sent data packets
were delivered successfully. This time, the reason behind
this behavior is the increased number of control messages
exchanged to mitigate the attack, as seen in Fig.3d.
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TABLE III
SIMULATION RESULTS FOR THE FOUR EXPERIMENTS (THREE ATTACKS SCENARIOS), USING CONTIKIMAC RDC PROTOCOL.
Scenario
Average PDR Average E2E Latency (in seconds) Average Power Consumption(per received packet - in mWatt)
Exchanged RPL Control Messages (per legitimate node)
Sent Received
UM-I PSM-I PSMrp-I PSM-E UM-I PSM-I PSMrp-I PSM-E UM-I PSM-I PSMrp-I PSM-E UM-I PSM-I PSMrp-I PSM-E UM-I PSM-I PSMrp-I PSM-E
Default Setting - (Fig.3)
No Attack 98.40% 98.36% 98.10% 97.45% 0.480 0.374 0.575 0.656 0.00664 0.00658 0.00715 0.00809 29 29 32 30 63 60 55 68
BH Attack 80.55% 80.21% 80.31% 97.82% 23.792 27.307 28.277 0.672 0.00931 0.00900 0.00951 0.00813 34 33 36 30 78 73 78 71
SF Attack 69.56% 69.85% 69.63% 97.11% 324.754 322.885 320.194 0.725 0.00920 0.00927 0.00975 0.00814 30 30 37 31 66 65 67 72
NA Attack 79.49% 83.43% 92.72% 96.97% 45.506 49.610 8.885 0.680 0.00809 0.00793 0.01035 0.00804 32 32 52 32 70 70 127 73
First Suggestion - (Fig.4)
No Attack 98.04% 98.08% 98.19% 97.55% 0.806 0.529 0.533 1.038 0.00650 0.00670 0.00696 0.00732 31 31 34 32 74 76 81 86
BH Attack 85.32% 84.94% 85.50% 97.93% 17.783 17.998 17.695 0.562 0.00781 0.00804 0.00824 0.00733 33 34 37 32 83 85 90 85
SF Attack 77.82% 75.79% 76.92% 98.04% 213.223 231.112 214.871 0.485 0.00779 0.00825 0.00885 0.00724 31 31 36 32 75 76 85 85
NA Attack 86.00% 86.50% 94.74% 97.70% 44.424 33.717 4.486 0.631 0.00716 0.00708 0.00930 0.00714 32 32 51 32 77 76 132 81
Second Suggestion - (Fig.5)
No Attack 98.32% 97.71% 98.02% 97.02% 0.425 1.076 0.889 1.990 0.00696 0.00750 0.00741 0.00895 29 33 36 34 53 59 60 61
BH Attack 88.78% 87.81% 87.74% 97.08% 8.213 10.367 10.591 1.896 0.00892 0.00922 0.00968 0.00878 35 36 41 34 66 67 71 61
SF Attack 69.41% 69.33% 69.59% 97.02% 312.429 312.945 307.448 1.843 0.00993 0.00974 0.01037 0.00864 33 32 37 33 55 53 57 61
NA Attack 79.93% 83.05% 93.84% 96.74% 52.318 48.455 4.596 1.960 0.00888 0.00847 0.01124 0.00895 35 34 58 34 61 59 104 62
TABLE IV
SIMULATION RESULTS FOR THE FOUR EXPERIMENTS (FOUR ATTACKS SCENARIOS), USING NULLRDC RDC PROTOCOL.
Scenario
Average PDR Average E2E Latency (in seconds)
Exchanged RPL Control Messages (per legitimate node)
Sent Received
UM-I PSM-I PSMrp-I PSM-E UM-I PSM-I PSMrp-I PSM-E UM-I PSM-I PSMrp-I PSM-E UM-I PSM-I PSMrp-I PSM-E
Default Setting - (Fig.6)
No Attack 99.15% 98.74% 98.22% 98.80% 0.033 0.034 0.047 0.036 27 27 36 26 47 47 53 45
BH Attack 80.28% 80.44% 80.72% 98.93% 31.302 28.266 26.500 0.036 30 30 39 27 54 54 58 47
SF Attack 70.07% 70.16% 69.83% 98.52% 323.857 323.858 329.444 0.036 28 28 37 27 49 50 54 47
NA Attack 79.57% 82.77% 94.98% 98.60% 56.762 53.242 2.923 0.036 28 28 57 27 49 49 86 47
WH Attack 78.32% 78.46% 82.59% 79.19% 218.413 223.518 159.881 207.210 29 28 47 29 52 51 58 51
First Suggestion - (Fig.7)
No Attack 98.84% 98.69% 98.02% 98.89% 0.052 0.038 0.052 0.040 27 27 38 27 51 51 60 50
BH Attack 82.61% 84.64% 83.86% 98.78% 23.728 19.043 16.321 0.036 29 29 40 27 55 55 63 52
SF Attack 73.73% 72.93% 73.44% 98.48% 284.978 291.616 277.439 0.036 27 27 38 27 48 49 57 52
NA Attack 85.24% 85.49% 97.24% 98.86% 41.850 47.155 0.566 0.036 27 28 52 27 51 51 80 53
WH Attack 80.08% 80.74% 85.07% 80.99% 199.385 200.145 135.046 190.021 29 28 51 29 60 58 69 58
Second Suggestion - (Fig.8)
No Attack 98.66% 98.72% 98.97% 98.50% 0.362 0.164 0.036 0.691 30 30 35 29 53 53 64 52
BH Attack 88.90% 88.68% 86.09% 98.46% 8.976 9.161 10.962 0.479 32 33 38 30 59 61 70 55
SF Attack 70.18% 70.11% 66.94% 98.58% 309.822 311.586 323.208 0.426 30 30 34 30 49 49 58 55
NA Attack 81.19% 85.66% 97.45% 98.42% 45.938 46.157 0.823 0.503 30 31 42 30 51 54 75 55
WH Attack 82.91% 82.62% 83.27% 83.25% 134.065 134.374 135.079 135.804 32 33 49 32 58 59 63 58
B. NullRDC Set Results
Comparing Fig.6 to Fig.3, it is clear that we have similar
results for the first four scenarios (No Attack, BH, SF, and
NA) in both RDC protocols, i.e., NullRDC and ContikiMAC.
Hence, the focus of this analysis will be on the Wormhole
(WH) attack scenario. The effects of the WH attack on the
routing DODAG can be seen in Fig.10.
Effects on packet delivery rate (PDR): The WH attack
successfully lowered the PDR to the low 80th percentile in
all scenarios, regardless of the used RPL’s secure mode or the
adversary type. Our observation shows that the reason behind
such behavior is because the adversaries are transparent to
the network and that all control messages (from both sides of
the wormhole) are forwarded and received within their time-
windows, deceiving the legitimate nodes to think they are in
close proximity.
Effects on the E2E latency: Since most of the affected
nodes were unable to deliver their data packets successfully,
the average E2E latency of the network rose to 200 seconds
- see Fig.6b. RPL’s replay protection mechanism slightly
reduced the effect of the WH attack. However, this is due
to having slight delays with the CC message exchanges.
Effects on the exchanged number of RPL’s control
messages: At a first look, it is evident that using RPL over
NullRDC protocol reduces the number of exchanged control
packets compared to using the ContikiMAC protocol, which
has been documented in [29]. Besides that, the WH attack
exchanged a similar number of control messages as in the
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(a) No Attack scenario and SF Attack
scenario (all experiments except PSM-
E)
(b) Blackhole Attack scenario (all
experiments), and all scenarios for
PSM-E.
(c) Neighbor Attack scenario (UM-I
and PSM-I).
(d) Neighbor Attack scenario
(PSMrp-I).
Fig. 9. Routing DODAGs during the investigated scenarios.
other attacks, with the replay protection mechanism in PSMrp
slightly increasing that number over the other experiments.
VI. DISCUSSIONS
Based on the analysis of the obtained results, we can put
the following observations and, as a result, some suggestions
to improve RPL’s response to the investigated attacks.
A. Observations
• Using RPL in PSM (and by extension, the ASM) can mit-
igate the external adversaries of the Blackhole, Selective-
Forward, and Neighbor attacks, as long as the adversary
does not run RPL in any secure mode.
• RPL’s performance using PSM (without the replay pro-
tection mechanism) is similar to that when using UM,
but with the added benefit of mitigating the external
adversaries of the BH, SF, and Neighbor attacks as
investigated in this paper.
• RPL’s secure modes cannot mitigate out-of-band Worm-
hole attacks (with the NullRDC protocol at the Link
layer) as their adversaries can operate external to the
network.
• It is worth mentioning that we ran another experiment
(using ContikiMAC) that had the external adversary run-
ning RPL in PSM while not knowing the encryption key
used by the legitimate nodes. The results from that ex-
periment were identical to the PSM-E experiment except
for the Neighbor attack scenario, which was successfully
launched. Since each type of RPL control messages
has its unique ICMPv6 "Code" value, with the secure
versions having different values than the unsecure ones,
only a node that runs RPL in PSM/ASM could identify
the secure versions of RPL control messages. Hence,
the adversary was able to identify RPL’s secure DIO
messages and replay them.
• Enabling RPL’s replay protection mechanism will sig-
nificantly reduce the effect of Neighbor attacks on PDR
and E2E latency. However, in its current implementation,
it will increase the power consumption as well, which
can lead to energy depletion of the devices. In theory, an
Fig. 10. Routing DODAG during Wormhole Attack scenario (all experiments)
adversary can replay DIO messages regularly to keep the
affected nodes always busy with the consistency checks,
leading to depletion of their energy and shutdown.
• RPL’s secure modes require more memory and storage
spaces than the unsecured mode, which means not all
IoT devices can use them – see §IV-A.
B. Suggestions to Reduce the Effects of Routing Attacks on
RPL’s Performance
Based on the observations mentioned above, we propose
the following suggestions to help reduce the effects of rout-
ing attacks on RPL’s performance, without introducing any
additional security mechanisms or systems.
1) Designing the network topology in a way where there
are more alternative paths toward the root node and more
neighbors per node. This would decrease the recovery
time required for nodes to overcome a Blackhole attack
and reduce the effects from the other investigated attacks
on PDR and E2E latency.
2) Reducing the timeout duration after which an RPL
router should declare a preferred parent as "dead". Cur-
rently, ContikiRPL uses fixed timeout values for the
upward (UIP_CONF_ND6_REACHABLE_TIME) and
downward routes (RPL_CONF_DEFAULT_LIFETIME),
both set to 10 minutes. Reducing these values could
decrease the E2E latency and increase the PDR of the
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network under some attack situations. However, static
decrements may also increase power consumption when
there are no attacks. Our recommendation is to use a
dynamic approach for adapting these timeout values to
the network’s changing conditions. For example, ran-
domizing the timeout values after each expiration, or
using the IPv6 over Low-powered Wireless Personal Area
Network-Neighbor Discovery (6LoWPAN-ND) protocol
[30]–[32], which aids RPL to detect node’s neighbors and
checks their status in a resource-friendly way.
C. Evaluation of the Proposed Suggestions
For the first suggestion, having more routes toward the root
node means adding more routing nodes. Hence, we added three
routing nodes (29, 30, and 31) to the topology - see Fig.11.
In the Wormhole attack scenario, we also added three routing
nodes (30, 31, and 32), which are located at the same positions
as in Fig.11 but with the topology in Fig.2.
To evaluate the effect of the second suggestion on RPL’s
performance under the investigated attacks, both "dead parent"
timeouts (see §VI-B) were set to five minutes. The use of a
fixed value instead of a dynamic approach was used to examine
the effect of the reduced "dead parent" timeouts only. The
topology for the evaluation is the same topology used in Fig.1.
The whole evaluation was conducted using the same metrics
and methodology as in §IV.
Effects on packet delivery rate (PDR): Comparing Fig.4a
to Fig.3a (ContikiMAC) and Fig.7a to Fig.6a (NullRDC),
we can see that the first suggestion slightly enhanced the
network’s PDR for the BH, SF, and NA scenarios, adding
about 6% more delivered packets. From our observation, the
reason behind this improvement is that some of the affected
nodes chose the new alternative routes, minimizing the effect
of the investigated attacks.
On the other hand, the second suggestion affected only the
BH scenario, increasing the PDR to a respected 88% - this
is clear from comparing Fig.5a to Fig.3a (ContikiMAC) and
Fig.8a to Fig.6a (NullRDC). The reduced timeouts caused the
effected nodes to detect the adversary parent faster and switch
to a different parent. However, this suggestion does not have
any effect in the case of the other attacks, since their adversary
reacts to received messages, unlike the Blackhole’s adversary.
However, neither suggestion had any effect on RPL’s per-
formance in the Wormhole attack scenario.
Effects on the E2E latency: Fig.4b and 7b show that
the first suggestion decreased the E2E in the case of the
SF scenario, especially for the ContikiMAC protocol (∼220
seconds, down from ∼320 seconds) compared to NullRDC
(∼270 seconds, down from ∼ 330 seconds). Again, this is
because some of the affected nodes chose the alternative routes
away from the adversary and more data packets are delivered.
As for the second suggestion (Fig.5b and 8b), the main
enhancement occurred is in the case of the BH scenario (10
seconds down from 30 seconds). As the affected nodes were
able to detect the dead adversary parent much faster, the total
E2E was reduced by more than 50%.
Effects on the exchanged number of RPL’s control
messages: As seen in Fig.4d, The first suggestion increased
Fig. 11. Network topology for the first suggestion.
the number of received control messages for the ContikiMAC
set. However, the reason this time is the added routing nodes
themselves but not due to the attacks. On the other hand, the
second suggestion (see Fig.5d) slightly reduced the number of
received RPL control messages, especially in the NA scenario.
From Fig.7c and 8c, we can see that both suggestions do
not have any effect on the exchanged control messages when
NullRDC is used. This is due to the always-on radio and the
simpler sending mechanism.
Effects on power consumption: Figures 4c and 5c show
that the average network power consumption (per received
packet) has been reduced for the first suggestion while in-
creased for the second one. The reason behind the reduction
for the first suggestion is that more data packets are delivered
successfully. However, the power consumption increase in the
second suggestion experiments is because more probing is
performed for parent’s freshness (due to the shorter timeouts).
It is worth mentioning that this analysis is only valid for
ContikiMAC set and not NullRDC, as we were not able to
collect usable power readings for the latter - see §IV-D.
From the discussion above, we can conclude that, individu-
ally, our two suggestions have mostly a positive effect on the
network when under an attack. Hence, combining both of the
suggestions with a dynamic timeout setup would further en-
hance RPL’s performance without taxing the scarce resources
of the nodes. This, however, is still being investigated.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we evaluated the performance of RPL and
its security mechanisms under the presence of four common
routing attacks (the Blackhole, Selective-Forward, Neighbor,
and Wormhole attacks). The evaluation was carried using
two widely used RDC protocols, ContikiMAC and NullRDC.
Our analysis showed that using RPL in PSM can mitigate
IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS, VOL. XX, NO. X, XXX 2020 11
external adversaries of the investigated attacks (except for the
Wormhole attack) as long as the adversaries do not run RPL
in PSM/ASM. It also showed that using RPL in PSM/ASM
without the replay protection does not consume more energy
than RPL in UM. It has been confirmed that enabling the
replay protection mechanism of RPL reduces the effect of the
Neighbor attack at the expense of consuming more energy.
We proposed two suggestions to be considered when design-
ing RPL-based IoT networks: (i) having more routes toward
the root node and (ii) reducing the "dead parent" timeouts.
Evaluating each of these suggestions showed improved perfor-
mance of RPL under the investigated attacks. We argue that
further investigation should be conducted on implementing
both of the suggestions at the same time while having a
dynamic approach for the "dead parent" timeouts optimization.
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